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RISK DISTRIBUTION AND                                
THE LAW OF TORTS:                                              
CARRYING CALABRESI FURTHER 
MARK A. GEISTFELD* 
I 
INTRODUCTION 
Just over fifty years ago, in a seminal article called Some Thoughts on Risk 
Distribution and the Law of Torts, Guido Calabresi addressed the claim made 
by leading scholars that the “central policy issue in tort law is whether the 
principal criterion of liability is to be based on individual fault or a wide 
distribution of risk and loss.”1 As Calabresi pointed out, “to say ‘risk 
distribution’ is really to say very little.”2 Risk distribution, he explained, is an 
ambiguous concept that can refer to the manner in which tort liability for 
accidental harms affects the allocation of scarce resources, the spreading of 
losses across society, or the attainment of normatively desirable distributive 
outcomes. Calabresi then systematically employed economic analysis to show 
how these different conceptions of risk distribution affect the formulation of 
tort rules, a novel approach that made the article one of the (two) founding 
documents of the new economic analysis of law.3 
The first two conceptions of risk distribution identified by Calabresi—the 
allocation of scarce resources and risk spreading—are combined in the (now) 
conventional economic analysis of tort law. Under this analysis, tort rules 
should minimize the social cost of accidents first by incentivizing risky actors to 
exercise cost-effective care, and then by spreading the residual risks to minimize 
insurance costs. 
Although the conventional economic analysis of minimizing accident costs 
can be traced to Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the Law of Torts, 
Calabresi has not embraced the approach with the same fervor as others. 
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 1.  70 YALE L.J. 499, 499 (1961) (quoting CHARLES O. GREGORY & HARRY KALVEN, CASES 
AND MATERIALS ON TORTS 689 (1st ed. 1959)). 
 2.  Id. 
 3.  See Richard Posner, The Economic Approach to Law, 53 TEX. L. REV. 757, 758–59 (1975) 
(characterizing the publication of articles by Calabresi and Ronald Coase in the early 1960s as giving 
birth to the “new” economic analysis of law, which differs from prior economic analyses that did not 
“apply economic analysis in a systematic way to areas of law that did not purport to regulate economic 
relationships”).  
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Drawing in part on the scholarship of Ronald Dworkin, Calabresi explained in a 
subsequent article that an inquiry exclusively concerned with minimizing 
accident costs in order to attain allocative efficiency, “defined narrowly to mean 
wealth maximization,” is a “meaningless concept” without a basis in the 
normatively appropriate “starting points or distributional values.”4 Calabresi 
also made the same type of point in his highly influential book The Costs of 
Accidents: “I do not treat [justice or fairness] as a goal of the same type as cost 
reduction but as a veto or constraint on what can be done to achieve cost 
reduction.”5 As implied by Calabresi’s repeated emphasis on the fundamental 
importance of entitlements and their associated distributive values, the only 
issue of risk distribution that ultimately matters is whether tort rules distribute 
risk in the manner required by the governing distributive norms of fairness or 
justice, a matter not adequately addressed by the conventional economic 
analysis of tort law.6 
Calabresi’s concern for distributive matters is most fully expressed in a later 
article, The Pointlessness of Pareto: Carrying Coase Further.7 Calabresi first 
showed that society must always be at a Pareto-optimal point, or one at which 
no change is possible that would gain unanimous consent: “Transaction costs 
(including problems of rationality and knowledge), no less than existing 
technology, define what is currently achievable in any society—the Pareto 
frontier. It follows that any given society is always or will immediately arrive at 
a Pareto-optimal point given transaction costs.”8 Calabresi accordingly 
concluded “that the Pareto criterion is of no general use as a normative guide,”9 
a limitation that makes it necessary for economists to account for distributive 
concerns: 
For if where we are is, for the moment, Pareto optimal and, absent innovations, all 
improvements must, ex ante, entail some losers, then we can also do away with . . . 
“convenient” assumptions designed to negate the existence of losers. Distributional 
analysis becomes inevitable and hence essential, and economists must, at a minimum, 
become explicit about the distributional judgments (or guesses) that they are making. 
Decisionmakers can then accept or reject such judgments and guesses as they choose. 
 
 4.  Guido Calabresi, First Party, Third Party, and Product Liability Systems: Can Economic 
Analysis of Law Tell Us Anything About Them?, 69 IOWA L. REV. 833, 833–34 (1984) [hereinafter 
Calabresi, First Party, Third Party, and Product Liability Systems] (citing other scholars who had 
reached a similar conclusion, including Ronald Dworkin, Why Efficiency?, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 563 
(1980) [hereinafter Dworkin, Why Efficiency?]). In an earlier exchange with Dworkin, Calabresi stated 
that “I found myself substantially in agreement” with Dworkin’s position. Guido Calabresi, An 
Exchange: About Law and Economics: A Letter to Ronald Dworkin, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 553, 554 
(1980) (discussing Ronald M. Dworkin, Is Wealth a Value?, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 191 (1980)).  
 5.  GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 24 n.1 
(1970). 
 6.  Although the conventional economic analysis of tort law maintains that the redistribution of 
wealth from the rich to the poor can be attained at least cost by tax transfers rather than by tort rules, 
these wealth redistributions do not fully exhaust the other forms of redistribution that might be 
required as a matter of justice or fairness. See infra Part IV. 
 7.  100 YALE L.J. 1211 (1991) [hereinafter Calabresi, The Pointlessness of Pareto]. 
 8.  Id. at 1212. 
 9.  Id. at 1216. 
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But economists need no longer use terms in ways that, however unintentionally, can 
easily be misunderstood by decisionmakers as leading to conclusions that have 
normative validity independent of their distributional effects!
10
 
As Calabresi had recognized in an earlier article, the normative validity of a 
distributional outcome is determined by initial entitlements: “[A]bsent such a 
notion of starting points, we cannot say anything about distribution or equality 
either. We cannot meaningfully say that we have treated Marshall and Taney 
equally, or justly favored Marshall over Taney, without a concept of what it is to 
treat them equally.”11 The just distribution of risk depends on the initial 
specification of legal entitlements, which in turn depends on the principle of 
equality that guides (and constrains) the legal system. 
Having recognized that the principle of equality determines the just 
distribution of risk in tort law, Calabresi then maintained that the issue can be 
informed by economic analysis: 
For it seems to me that economists and lawyer-economists can have a great deal to 
say, as scholars, about what is distributionally desirable. We need not simply make our 
distributional judgments clear and let political decisionmakers accept them or not. We 
can develop scholarly definitions of just distributions, both theoretical definitions, and 
definitions based on empirical studies of particular societies. But a further discussion 
of such distributional studies . . . must await subsequent articles.
12
 
The subsequent articles never appeared for reasons amply explained by the 
demands of a law-school deanship followed by those of a federal judicial 
appointment. Although Calabresi has underscored the importance of 
distributive economic analysis, this methodological approach remains largely 
undeveloped. 
In this article, I try to carry Calabresi further by more rigorously showing 
how distributive economic analysis can be relevant to the normative evaluation 
of tort law. In contrast to Calabresi’s conclusion about the “pointlessness of 
Pareto,” I argue in part II that the Pareto principle embodies an autonomy-
based compensatory norm that tort law can rely on to implement corrective 
justice under nonideal conditions that foreclose fully compensatory consensual 
exchanges. Because the compensatory decision rule governs forced exchanges, 
it must be limited to those nonconsensual interactions that adequately respect 
the autonomy of the two interacting parties. Within the context of these forced 
exchanges, a compensatory payment satisfies a compensatory obligation, which 
in turn is defined by the correlative compensatory right. In part III, I identify 
the substantive properties of a compensatory tort right and then show how the 
right holder’s compensatory demands can be fully satisfied by the duty holder’s 
exercise of reasonable care in a wide range of cases. A compensatory norm can 
be fully implemented by the distribution of risk without requiring an 
 
 10.  Id. at 1228. 
 11.  Calabresi, First Party, Third Party, and Product Liability Systems, supra note 4, at 850 
(emphasis added). 
 12.  Calabresi, The Pointlessness of Pareto, supra note 7, at 1228; see also Calabresi, First Party, 
Third Party, and Product Liability Systems, supra note 4, at 843 (“In choosing among systems of auto 
accident avoidance we . . . must take the distributional preferences of our society into account.”). 
8_GEISTFELD_EIC (DO NOT DELETE) 7/6/2014  1:35 PM 
168 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 77:165 
entitlement to compensatory damages in the event of injury, a conclusion that 
sheds new light on Calabresi’s original insight about the varied meanings of risk 
distribution within tort law. 
As I have argued at length elsewhere, such a compensatory norm 
persuasively explains the important tort doctrines governing physical harm,13 
and so in part IV, I employ distributive economic analysis to show how the tort 
system can be conceptualized as a compensatory mechanism. Tort 
compensation is not merely a form of accident insurance as assumed by the 
conventional economic analysis of tort law; it fits readily into Calabresi’s 
taxonomy of desirable legal innovations that shift the Pareto frontier 
outwards.14 By expanding the feasible set of fully compensatory outcomes that 
can be attained under existing social conditions, the tort system enables 
individuals to engage in new risky activities while adequately compensating 
those who are disadvantaged by the risky behavior. The tort system has a 
normative dimension that is brought into sharp relief by the type of distributive 
economic analysis championed by Calabresi but neglected by the conventional 
economic analysis of tort law. 
II 
THE PARETO PRINCIPLE AS A NORMATIVE GUIDE UNDER NONIDEAL 
CONDITIONS 
Under the Pareto principle, the allocation of resources in state B is (Pareto) 
superior to an alternative allocation in state A if and only if the move from A to 
B would make at least one person better off and no one worse off. Those who 
would benefit from the change would support it, and no one else would disagree 
because none of them would be harmed by the change. Consequently, the 
Pareto test “is a simple unanimity requirement.”15 
Within welfare economics, the Pareto criterion provides a method for 
overcoming the limitations of utilitarianism. In the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries, traditional welfare economists compared alternative 
situations by assuming that individual utilities can be quantified (as cardinal 
measures) and then compared across individuals. This decision rule selects 
utility-maximizing outcomes, and so its normative justifiability depends on the 
validity of utilitarianism.16 By the late 1930s, the need to make interpersonal 
utility comparisons troubled welfare economists.17 To solve this problem, 
 
 13.  See generally MARK A. GEISTFELD, TORT LAW: THE ESSENTIALS (2008) [hereinafter 
GEISTFELD, TORT LAW]. 
 14.  Cf. Calabresi, The Pointlessness of Pareto, supra note 7, at 1230 (discussing different types of 
innovations, including those that can result in shifts of the Pareto frontier “which create winners and 
may or may not create losers as well”). 
 15.  Id. at 1215. 
 16.  See, e.g., Amartya Sen, The Possibility of Social Choice, 89 AM. ECON. REV. 349, 351–52 
(1999) (tracing origins of traditional welfare economics to Jeremy Bentham’s utilitarianism). 
 17.  Id. at 352 (discussing the influence of L. Robbins, Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility: A 
Comment, 48 ECON. J. 635 (1938)). 
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prominent economists rejected the utilitarian decision rule in favor of the new 
welfare economics, which posits that interpersonal utility comparisons are 
impossible or otherwise outside the scope of economic analysis. The new 
welfare economics compares alternative economic situations by relying on the 
Pareto principle, which evaluates policies in terms of unanimous choice rather 
than interpersonal utility comparisons. “[A]ll the important conclusions of 
welfare economics can be made to follow from” an analysis reformulated in 
terms of individual choice rather than the cardinal measures of individual utility 
or welfare required by utilitarianism.18 
In order for a change to satisfy the Pareto criterion, those who would 
otherwise be disadvantaged by the change must be fully compensated by those 
who would benefit from it. The compensatory exchange requires the actual 
consent (or unanimous approval) of all concerned parties, yielding an outcome 
in which no one is made worse off (due to the receipt of full compensation) and 
at least one person is made better off (one’s willingness to make a 
compensatory payment implies the proposed change must, on balance, make 
her better off). 
As is widely recognized, however, the requirement of actual consent to fully 
compensatory exchanges turns the Pareto principle into a practically 
unattainable ideal.19 What, then, should be made of the Pareto principle under 
nonideal conditions in which actual consent to fully compensatory exchanges is 
not feasible? The answer depends on whether the governing principle of 
equality is welfarist or instead accounts for nonwelfarist concerns of individual 
autonomy or equal freedom. 
A. Welfarism and the Pareto Principle 
A welfarist principle of equality, such as utilitarianism, is only concerned 
about welfare; it values change only insofar as it would increase individual 
welfare, and by extension, social welfare. Within a welfarist system, the Pareto 
principle has only instrumental value: Any change that would be Pareto 
superior must also increase social welfare. The Pareto principle is merely an 
instrument for identifying welfare-enhancing policy changes. Aside from this 
role, the Pareto requirement of unanimous approval has no independent 
normative value under welfarism. 
For example, suppose there are 100 individuals in a community that is 
considering two tort rules. “Rule 1” would make each person in the community 
better off by one unit of welfare, satisfying the Pareto principle. “Rule 2” would 
make ninety-nine people better off by 1.10 units of welfare, while making one 
person worse off by eight units of welfare. Suppose the social-welfare function 
is utilitarian (a form of welfarism), so that the social planner gives equal weight 
to each unit of individual welfare. The planner will choose Rule 2, which has a 
 
 18.  I.M.D. LITTLE, A CRITIQUE OF WELFARE ECONOMICS 36–37 (2d ed. 1957). 
 19.  E.g., id. at 95–96. 
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total welfare gain of 100.9 units, whereas Rule 1 has a total welfare gain of 100 
units. The unanimous approval of Rule 1 is irrelevant to the utilitarian planner. 
Welfarism in general, like utilitarianism in particular, merely compares total 
welfare under the two rules and places no weight on the fact one rule is 
unanimously approved and the other is not.20 
Within a welfarist system, individual consent matters only because without 
the ability to “measur[e] utility directly, the only way to demonstrate that a 
change in the allocation of resources is Pareto superior is to show that everyone 
affected by the change consented to it.”21 When governed by a welfarist 
principle of equality, the Pareto criterion merely provides a reliable way to 
determine whether a change would increase social welfare. The criterion has no 
other value. 
For this reason, the welfarist rationale for the Pareto principle extends to 
nonideal conditions in which transaction costs prevent fully compensatory 
consensual exchanges. For any proposed change that would benefit some 
individuals and harm others, if the winners would be willing to fully compensate 
the losers, the change must be welfare-enhancing per the logic of the Pareto 
principle, regardless of whether the exchange actually occurs. The welfare 
properties of the Pareto principle are not altered by the absence of fully 
compensatory exchanges. 
But in contrast to the ideal formulation of the Pareto principle, the nonideal 
formulation relies on hypothetical compensation and hypothetical consent. A 
hypothetical compensatory exchange poses no problem for welfarism, however, 
as long as there is a reliable method for monetizing the costs and benefits of the 
proposed change.22 
Known as the Kaldor–Hicks criterion, this decision rule forms the basis of 
cost-benefit analysis. It tries to replicate the welfare-enhancing properties of the 
Pareto principle under nonideal conditions in which policy changes cannot be 
implemented by fully compensatory consensual exchanges. Social conditions 
that block consensual agreements pose no intractable problem for a welfarist 
conception of the Pareto principle. 
This version of the Pareto principle is embodied in the conventional 
economic analysis of tort law, which employs cost-benefit analysis (the Kaldor–
Hicks criterion) to formulate liability rules that minimize the social cost of 
 
 20.  To be sure, the utilitarian planner could select the welfare-maximizing outcome and then 
obtain unanimous approval by redistributing the welfare gain to ensure that everyone is made better 
off. Doing so could only be justified, however, if the redistribution would increase social welfare. Once 
again, the utilitarian decision is governed by the increase in social welfare and not unanimous approval. 
 21.  Richard A. Posner, The Ethical and Political Basis of the Efficiency Norm in Common Law 
Adjudication, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 487, 488–89 (1980) [hereinafter Posner, The Ethical and Political 
Basis of the Efficiency Norm]. 
 22.  Cf. id. at 490 (“[I]f the utilitarian could devise a practical utility-metric he could dispense with 
the consensual or transactional method of determining whether an allocation of resources was Pareto 
superior; indeed, he could dispense with the concept of Pareto superiority itself.”). 
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accidents.23 The welfarist version of the Pareto principle accordingly supplies a 
normative rationale for cost-minimizing tort rules. 
B. Individual Autonomy and the Pareto Principle 
Welfarism is not the only plausible method for specifying the requirements 
of equality. If the principle of equality instead requires the government to give 
each citizen an equal opportunity to lead a life of his or her own choosing, then 
the Pareto principle is normatively valuable for nonwelfarist reasons of 
individual autonomy and equal freedom. 
The relation between the Pareto principle and individual autonomy has 
been famously discussed by Richard Posner: 
[I]t is also possible to locate Pareto ethics in a different philosophical tradition from 
the utilitarian, in the tradition, broadly Kantian, which attaches a value over and 
above the utilitarian to individual autonomy. One ethical criterion of change that is 
highly congenial to the Kantian emphasis on autonomy is consent. And consent is the 
operational basis of the concept of Pareto superiority.
24
 
Having recognized that the normative appeal of the Pareto criterion can be 
defined by the promotion of individual autonomy through consensual exchange, 
Posner then made the more provocative claim that a potential Pareto 
improvement—one that satisfies the Kaldor–Hicks criterion of hypothetical 
compensation—also furthers the normative value of autonomy because 
individuals would hypothetically consent to such changes.25 On Posner’s view, 
both the Pareto principle and the Kaldor–Hicks criterion can be justified in the 
nonwelfarist terms of individual autonomy, eliminating any normative 
difference between the two and the concomitant need to define one as the 
normatively ideal decision rule (the Pareto principle) and the other as its 
nonideal counterpart (the Kaldor–Hicks criterion). 
Numerous scholars have forcefully rejected this claim, including both 
Calabresi and Dworkin. Both rejected the claim for similar reasons pertaining 
to ambiguities in the hypothetical construct assumed by Posner’s analysis.26 
Dworkin also pointed out that without the requirement of actual consent, “the 
Pareto criterion . . . simply collapses into the utilitarian criterion.”27 The 
relevant decision rule is reduced to the form of cost-benefit analysis entailed by 
the Kaldor–Hicks test, which is comparable to the Pareto criterion only insofar 
as each identifies policy proposals that promote social welfare. Only the 
requirement of actual consent differentiates the two tests, leading Dworkin to 
 
 23.  See sources cited supra notes 3–4 and accompanying text. 
 24.  Posner, The Ethical and Political Basis of the Efficiency Norm, supra note 21, at 489–90. 
 25.  Id. at 491–94.  
 26.  Compare Calabresi, The Pointlessness of Pareto, supra note 7, at 1223 (“The moment we deal 
with a real situation, we know something more about who wins and who loses. Once we are no longer 
ignorant, any number of differences may cause us to believe that losses or gains to some matter more 
than losses or gains to others.”), with Dworkin, Why Efficiency?, supra note 4, at 579 (“But since Posner 
has in mind a counterfactual rather than an actual choice, any selection of a degree or date of ignorance 
must be wholly arbitrary, and different selections would dictate very different rules as fair.”). 
 27.  Dworkin, Why Efficiency?, supra note 4, at 582. 
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conclude that without such a requirement, “the Pareto justification is not simply 
weakened; it is destroyed.”28 
If the governing principle of equality is not welfarist but instead centers on 
individual autonomy or equal freedom, the Pareto criterion would seem to have 
value only insofar as actual consent enables individuals to exercise their 
autonomy. But actual consent is not feasible under nonideal conditions, and so 
the Pareto criterion would seem to be “pointless,” as Calabresi concluded.29 
Although one could understandably dismiss the Pareto principle for these 
reasons, doing so would be a mistake. In the same manner that welfarism has 
extracted the relevant welfare properties of the Pareto principle in order to 
guide decision making under nonideal conditions (the Kaldor–Hicks criterion), 
a nonwelfarist principle of equality can extract the relevant normative 
properties of the Pareto principle to formulate a decision rule governing cases 
in which transaction costs block fully compensatory consensual exchanges. 
Within a nonwelfarist system, the Pareto principle is appealing due to the 
way in which it equates socially cohesive outcomes with the individual 
autonomy furthered by fully compensatory consensual exchanges. The linkage 
of social cohesion, individual autonomy, and full compensation is still desirable 
under nonideal conditions lacking actual consent. The problem accordingly 
reduces to whether it is possible to construct a decision rule that furthers these 
values for cases in which the affected parties cannot enter into fully 
compensatory consensual exchanges. 
When actual consent is not feasible, the autonomy rationale for the Pareto 
principle can be retained by a decision rule that limits (nonconsensual) 
compensatory exchanges to forms of risky behavior that do not disvalue the 
autonomy of those threatened by the behavior. The normative linkage between 
autonomy and compensation would be lost if the decision rule relied on 
compensation as the sole means to regulate forms of behavior (like rape) that 
do not adequately respect the victim’s autonomy. The nonideal decision rule, 
therefore, must be limited to those highly common forms of social interaction 
that further the autonomy of risky actors without disvaluing or inherently 
disrespecting the autonomy of those threatened by the risk. As a matter of 
autonomy, the decision rule can permit these risky activities (like automobile 
driving) despite the absence of actual consent. When limited to social 
interactions of this type, a nonideal decision rule derived from the Pareto 
principle would then require risky actors to compensate those who are 
disadvantaged by the behavior. 
This compensatory decision rule requires further limitation. As Lawrence 
Sager has persuasively argued, the Pareto principle does not reliably identify all 
potentially justice-enhancing improvements because it does not account for 
 
 28.  Id. 
 29.  See Calabresi, The Pointlessness of Pareto, supra notes 7, at 1212, 1216; supra text 
accompanying notes 7–9. 
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issues of distributive justice.30 “[J]ustice is a multi-attributed quality” and 
“Pareto optimality is a relatively minor attribute of that quality.”31 As Sager 
further explained, the Pareto principle cannot reliably track the requirements of 
justice because it focuses on pair-wise comparisons: How does the status quo 
compare to a proposed alternative state of affairs? Such a decision rule is path 
dependent—it depends on the order in which the pair-wise comparisons are 
made—and can therefore lead to results that depart from the “true path” 
required by justice.32 Because “there is no readily apparent correlation between 
Pareto optimality and more central attributes of justice, like distributional 
equality,” Sager concluded that reliance on the Pareto principle for resolving all 
issues of justice is deeply problematic.33 To avoid the problems identified by 
Sager, a compensatory decision rule derived from the Pareto principle should 
not be applied to cases in which issues of distributive justice are presented or in 
which pair-wise comparisons otherwise create a long-term problem of path 
dependence. 
A decision rule satisfies these requirements when limited to the 
implementation of corrective justice, a form of justice that is exclusively 
concerned with the attainment of justice or equality between two interacting 
parties. In addition to addressing concerns distinct from those of distributive 
justice or equality across society, corrective justice is case specific and not 
subject to the longer-term problem of path dependence. Because it corrects an 
injustice or rights violation caused by a specific interaction between a right 
holder and duty holder, corrective justice can also be called “compensatory 
justice.”34 Consequently, issues of corrective justice can be defensibly addressed 
by a rights-based compensatory decision rule that seeks to implement the 
normatively appealing attributes of the Pareto principle under nonideal 
conditions. 
When guided by this decision rule, the welfare economist analyzes the 
distributive outcomes that would be produced by two alternative states of 
affairs and then identifies how a change from one state to the other can be 
corrected to ensure that those who would otherwise be disadvantaged by the 
change are adequately compensated. This form of distributive economic 
analysis is relevant only for those cases in which the underlying principle of 
equality justifies the corrective compensatory measure as being appropriate for 
 
 30.  Lawrence G. Sager, Pareto Superiority, Consent, and Justice, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 913, 916 
(1980). 
 31.  Id. 
 32.  Id. at 927. 
 33.  Id. at 916. A Paretian decision rule is also limited even within a welfarist system. See Giuseppe 
Dari-Mattacci & Nuno Garoupa, The Unsolvable Dilemma of a Paretian Policymaker, 16 SUP. CT. 
ECON. REV. 117 (2008) (providing a formal analysis showing “that a consistent welfarist method of 
policy assessment, that is, one that never violates the Pareto principle, may be incomplete in the sense 
that it is incapable of providing a solution to important social welfare problems”). 
 34.  See generally Loren E. Lomasky, Compensation and the Bounds of Rights, in NOMOS XXXIII: 
COMPENSATORY JUSTICE 13, 34 (John W. Chapman ed., 1991) (discussing case where requiring an 
actor to compensate an unwilling victim restores the victim’s losses). 
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protecting those who are disadvantaged by the change (recall the problem of 
rape). So conceptualized, distributive economic analysis is constrained by the 
normative requirements of equality while being integral to the implementation 
of (corrective) justice in concrete cases, the type of economic analysis advocated 
by Calabresi.35 
Such a decision rule can justifiably govern tort cases for reasons identified 
by liberal egalitarians: “Treating people with equal concern requires that people 
pay for the costs of their own choices.”36 As a matter of equality, tort law can 
require risky actors to pay for the cost of their autonomous choices by 
obligating them to compensate those who are disadvantaged by the interaction. 
This type of compensatory norm, embodied in the autonomy-based Pareto 
principle, can be implemented by a compensatory tort right and its correlative 
compensatory duty, making tort liability a form of corrective justice based on a 
first-order duty of compensation. A compensatory tort norm can also be limited 
to cases in which the nonconsensual interaction adequately respects the 
autonomy of the two parties, thereby satisfying the constraints of equality and 
extending the normative appeal of the Pareto principle to nonideal conditions. 
So formulated, the compensatory norm embodied in the Pareto principle can 
help to resolve tort disputes in cases lacking fully compensatory consensual 
exchanges. 
Conceptualizing tort liability in terms of a compensatory norm, however, 
would seem to create an insurmountable problem: Tort law does not ordinarily 
entitle accident victims to compensatory damages. The problem, though, may 
be more apparent than real; it rests on the unexamined premise that 
compensation is limited to the damages remedy. Any evaluation of a 
compensatory tort norm must begin with a more complete statement of a 
compensatory tort right and its implications for tort liability. 
III 
TORT COMPENSATION AS RISK DISTRIBUTION 
Within the context of a nonconsensual interaction or forced exchange, a 
compensatory payment is comprised of the resources required to satisfy a 
compensatory obligation. One’s compensatory obligation, in turn, is defined by 
the correlative compensatory entitlement held by the other party. 
Consequently, the attributes of a compensatory entitlement or tort right (and its 
correlative compensatory obligation or tort duty) determine the compensatory 
properties of tort law. 
 
 
 35.  See sources cited supra notes 4–12 and accompanying text. It is a separate question whether 
this particular form of distributive economic analysis would be embraced by Calabresi. His emphasis on 
the need for economic analysis to consider norms of justice or fairness would be satisfied by a welfarist 
conception of justice, which yields a different formulation of the Pareto principle under nonideal 
conditions for reasons previously discussed in part II.A.  
 36.  WILL KYMLICKA, CONTEMPORARY POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY: AN INTRODUCTION 75 (1990). 
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Under at least one formulation, a compensatory tort right can explain why 
tort law has adopted a default rule of negligence liability that does not entitle 
accident victims to compensatory damages unless the defendant breached the 
duty to exercise reasonable care. In a wide range of cases, the default rule of 
negligence liability can distribute risk in a manner that fully satisfies the 
demands of a compensatory right holder, yielding outcomes in which the duty 
holder makes the full compensatory payment through the exercise of 
reasonable care, thereby eliminating any further compensatory obligation to 
pay damages in the event of accidental harm. In the remaining cases, the 
compensatory norm justifies a rule of strict liability that must be supplemented 
by the default rule of negligence to ensure that risk is distributed in the manner 
required by the compensatory tort right. The compensatory properties of risk 
distribution can justify the default rule of negligence liability. 
A. A Compensatory Tort Right 
According to the Restatement (Second) of Torts, an individual interest that 
“is protected against any form of invasion . . . becomes the subject matter of a 
‘right.’”37 The specification of such a right necessarily prioritizes the protected 
interest of the right holder over the conflicting interest of the duty holder, 
making it possible for the tort rule to burden the subordinate interest of the 
duty holder in order to protect the prioritized interest of the right holder. For 
example, a rule that protects the individual interest in physical security gives the 
security interest of the right holder some sort of legal priority over the 
conflicting or invading liberty interest of the duty holder. To do so, the tort rule 
must first distinguish these interests in a manner that justifies a priority for the 
security interest. The nature of the priority then defines the substantive content 
of the tort right and correlative duty. Rights-based tort rules, therefore, can be 
characterized by the manner in which they prioritize the legally protected 
interests of the right holder over the conflicting or invading interests of the duty 
holder. 
Leading justice theorists have argued that tort law can prioritize one’s 
interest in physical security over another’s conflicting liberty interest for the 
basic reason that an individual must be adequately secure in order to live a 
meaningful life.38 The exercise of liberty is also essential for living a meaningful 
life, and so a priority of a right holder’s security interest cannot defensibly 
ignore or negate the duty holder’s conflicting liberty interest. The priority is 
justified by a principle of equality that values individual autonomy or self-
determination. This general principle holds that each person has an equal right 
 
 37.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 1 cmt. b (1979). 
 38.  See Richard Wright, Justice and Reasonable Care in Negligence Law, 47 AM. J. 
JURISPRUDENCE 143, 170–94 (2002) (explaining why leading justice theorists reject the utilitarian 
approach of weighing all interests equally and instead maintain that rights-based tort rules can 
prioritize the individual interest in physical security over the conflicting liberty and economic interests 
of others). 
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to autonomy (or freedom or self-determination) and then gives different values 
to the individual interests in physical security and liberty, depending on their 
relative importance for the exercise of the general right.39 In this respect, a tort 
right of security is relative to the right of liberty, a property that explains why 
courts have long recognized that “[m]ost of the rights of property, as well as of 
person . . . are not absolute but relative.”40 A relative right to physical security is 
based on a relative priority of the right holder’s security interest over the 
conflicting liberty interest of the duty holder, with the nature of that priority or 
relation being determined by the more general right to autonomy (or equal 
freedom or self-determination).41 
Based on a relative priority of the security interest, tort rules can be 
formulated “to give compensation, indemnity or restitution for harms”—the 
first purpose of liability according to the Restatement (Second) of Torts.42 If a 
duty holder’s exercise of liberty foreseeably causes physical harm to a right 
holder, a compensatory obligation burdens the duty holder’s subordinate liberty 
interest to compensate harms it caused to the prioritized security interest of the 
right holder; legal fault or an unreasonable liberty interest is not required to 
justify liability. The compensatory duty permits individuals to engage in risky 
behavior by relying on compensation to protect the right holder’s security 
interest, the type of outcome required by a right to security that is relative to a 
right to liberty. 
A compensatory duty does not limit liability to blameworthy behavior and is 
abstract in that sense. For cases in which both the duty holder and right holder 
are blameless, “it is a fait accompli that some innocent party will be 
burdened. . . . Therefore, it cannot be a moral requirement that no innocent 
party lose out as a consequence of his own blameless conduct. All that remains 
open for decision is how the loss is to be apportioned.”43 An abstract 
compensatory norm allocates that burden to the duty holder as risky actor 
based on the relative priority of the right holder’s legally protected interest in 
physical security. 
 
 
 39.  See, e.g., Jules Coleman & Arthur Ripstein, Mischief and Misfortune, 41 MCGILL L.J. 91, 97 
(1995) (arguing that tort law mediates and protects interests in liberty and security depending on the 
extent to which they are “necessary or important to living life in a liberal political culture”); Gregory C. 
Keating, Reasonableness and Rationality in Negligence Theory, 48 STAN. L. REV. 311, 354 (1996) (“For 
social contract theory, the interests at stake in accidental risk impositions are not mere preferences 
properly measured in dollars, but interests in liberty. These interests represent the background 
conditions necessary for the pursuit of conceptions of the good over the course of complete lives. 
Accordingly, proper evaluation of risks and precautions requires the qualitative assessment of the way 
particular risks and precautions burden the liberties necessary for persons to pursue the aims and 
aspirations that give meaning to their lives.”). 
 40.  Losee v. Buchanan, 51 N.Y. 476, 485 (1873). 
 41.  Cf. JOHN RAWLS, JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS: A RESTATEMENT 104 (2001) (“No basic liberty is 
absolute, since these liberties may conflict in particular cases and their claims must be adjusted to fit 
into one coherent scheme of liberties.”). 
 42.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 901(a) (1979). 
 43.  Lomasky, supra note 34, at 34 (discussing cases of necessity). 
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To be justifiable, a compensatory norm must account for any normative 
problems created by the right holder’s lack of consent and the poor manner in 
which compensatory damages might otherwise protect the right holder’s 
autonomy. Most obviously, a tort duty limited to the payment of monetary 
compensation for a nonconsensual physical harm can be deeply corrosive of the 
right holder’s autonomy (as in a case of rape). To ensure that a duty holder 
avoids behavior that disvalues the right holder’s autonomy, a compensatory tort 
norm can prohibit behavior of this type, justifying extracompensatory damages 
that punish the duty holder for having engaged in such reprehensible behavior.44 
A compensatory tort norm can determine the types of behavior for which a 
compensatory obligation adequately respects the right holder’s autonomy. 
In most cases, however, risky behavior entails no disrespect for the 
autonomy of others; the risk is an unwanted byproduct of the activity. To 
establish liability in these cases, a compensatory norm does not require 
culpability or personal fault. Instead, the duty holder’s exercise of liberty 
establishes the requisite form of responsibility for the foreseeable outcomes of 
the autonomous choice.45 The occurrence of foreseeable injury, not any moral 
shortcoming in the behavior itself, can then trigger the obligation to pay 
compensatory damages. 
This form of outcome responsibility is clearly reflected in the common law 
maxim sic utere tuo ut alienum non lædas, which for present purposes loosely 
translates into the principle “[u]se your own so as not to injure another.”46 The 
maxim locates the compensatory duty in the injury-causing conduct rather than 
the unreasonableness of the injurer’s behavior, and so it has frequently been 
invoked by courts and commentators to justify rules of strict liability.47 
Such a compensatory norm can be used not only to justify rules of strict 
liability, but also to explain why the tort system relies on a default rule of 
negligence liability to govern cases of accidental physical harm. The reason 
involves the manner in which the distribution of risk affects the compensatory 
properties of a tort rule. 
 
 44.  See generally Mark A. Geistfeld, Punitive Damages, Retribution, and Due Process, 81 S. CAL. 
L. REV. 263 (2008) (discussing the role of punitive damages within a compensatory tort system and 
showing that this role persuasively explains the relevant tort rules). 
 45.  For a more extended discussion of this conception of individual responsibility, see TONY 
HONORÉ, RESPONSIBILITY AND FAULT 14–40 (1999) and Stephen R. Perry, Responsibility for 
Outcomes, Risk, and the Law of Torts, in PHILOSOPHY AND THE LAW OF TORTS 72, 92–93 (Gerald 
Postema ed., 2001).  
 46.  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1238 (5th ed. 1979). As applied to risky behavior not involving 
the use of property, the maxim yields a common law principle that “under the common law a man acts 
at his peril.” OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 82 (1881) (stating that “some of the 
greatest common law authorities” held this view); see also Commonwealth ex rel. Attorney Gen. v. 
Russell, 33 A. 709, 711 (Pa. 1896) (“‘Sic utere tuo non alienum lædas’ expresses a moral obligation that 
grows out of the mere fact of membership of civil society. In many instances it has been applied as a 
measure of civil obligation, enforceable at law among those whose interests are conflicting.”).  
 47.  See, e.g., Perkins v. F.I.E. Corp., 762 F.2d 1250, 1254–56 (5th Cir. 1985) (noting that the sic 
utere maxim is the basis for the rule of strict liability governing ultrahazardous activities under 
Louisiana law). 
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B. Compensation and Cost-Minimizing Tort Rules 
In a compensatory tort system, the appropriate formulation of liability rules 
critically depends on context. Different types of risky interactions create 
different types of compensatory problems. The different compensatory 
problems have different solutions, most of which do not include an entitlement 
to compensatory damages in all cases. Tort rules can instead distribute risk in a 
manner that fully satisfies the demands of a compensatory right holder. 
A compensatory tort right entitles the right holder to prioritize her interest 
in physical security over conflicting liberty interests of the duty holder. If that 
priority applies to an interaction between the two parties, it justifies the right 
holder’s entitlement to compensatory damages in the event of injury. Such an 
interpersonal conflict of security and liberty interests, however, does not exist in 
all cases. The structure of the social interaction can result in the right holder 
internalizing both the benefits and burdens of the tort duty, creating an 
intrapersonal conflict of the right holder’s security and liberty interests. The 
right holder does not prioritize the security interest in these cases, and so the 
compensatory right no longer entails an entitlement to compensatory damages 
in the event of accidental harm. 
This outcome occurs when the right holder and duty holder (1) are engaged 
in reciprocally risky interactions or (2) are otherwise in a direct or indirect 
contractual relationship. In these cases, the right holder expects to derive a net 
benefit from the risky interaction, and that form of compensation is maximized 
by a negligence rule requiring the duty holder to exercise the cost-minimizing 
amount of reasonable care. Satisfaction of this duty distributes risk in a manner 
that satisfies fully the right holder’s compensatory demands. No entitlement to 
compensatory damages is necessary. 
First, consider tort rules governing reciprocal risks. For example, as two 
automobiles go past one another on the road, each driver simultaneously 
imposes a risk of physical harm on the other. For perfectly reciprocal risks, the 
interacting individuals are identical in all relevant respects, including the degree 
of risk each imposes on the other, the severity of injury threatened by the risk, 
and the liberty interests advanced by the risky behavior. Very few risky 
interactions will actually satisfy these conditions. However, due to the 
requirement of equal treatment, tort law evaluates risky behavior under an 
objective standard that in this instance asks whether the activity is common in 
the community.48 Automobile driving is such an activity, so, as an objective 
matter, tort rules governing automobile accidents apply to reciprocally situated 
 
 48.  Compare GEISTFELD, TORT LAW, supra note 13, at 93–95 (explaining why the autonomous 
choices made by a right holder—such as the decision not to drive automobiles—would violate the 
principle of equal treatment if these choices were to determine unilaterally whether the duty holder 
would be subject to negligence or strict liability, and further explaining that this result necessitates a 
rule that evaluates reciprocity in the objective terms of whether the activity is common in the 
community), with RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL 
HARMS § 20 cmt. j (2010) (“Whenever an activity is engaged in by a large fraction of the community, 
the absence of strict liability can be explained by considerations of reciprocity.”). 
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parties, even for cases in which the victim was walking or riding a bicycle. 
Reciprocity eliminates any relevant differences between the interacting 
parties. For example, each automobile driver has the identical right against the 
other, each owes an identical duty to the other, and each expects to derive a net 
benefit from the risky activity (the automobile trip in question). In these 
circumstances, neither party prioritizes the security interest over the liberty 
interest. Instead, each interacting individual reasonably prefers to formulate the 
tort rule so its benefits (fully accruing to the individual as reciprocal right 
holder) exceed its burdens or cost (also fully borne by the individual as 
reciprocal duty holder).49 By minimizing accident costs, the tort rule maximizes 
the net benefit that each expects to gain by participating in the activity. 
Reciprocity transforms the compensatory problem into one of cost 
minimization. 
For this reason, neither of the reciprocally situated parties prefers to use tort 
liability as a form of insurance. The associated costs of liability or third-party 
insurance (equally borne by each party as reciprocal duty holder) significantly 
exceed the total cost of first-party insurance and self-insurance (equally borne 
by each party as reciprocal right holder).50 To minimize costs, each reciprocally 
situated party prefers a tort rule formulated for deterrence purposes only, 
justifying a default rule of negligence liability that requires a safety precaution 
only if the benefit of risk reduction (fully accruing to each individual as 
reciprocal right holder) exceeds the burden or cost of the precaution (also fully 
borne by each individual as reciprocal duty holder). 
Presumably, the interacting parties would consent to such a rule prior to 
their risky interaction if they had the opportunity to do so. However, the rule’s 
normative rationale is based on individual autonomy and not hypothetical 
consent. A tort rule that rejected each individual’s preference for a cost-
minimizing negligence rule by instead prioritizing the security interest would be 
unreasonable or contrary to the autonomy of both parties to the risky 
interaction. For this class of cases, a negligence rule requiring the duty holder to 
exercise the cost-minimizing amount of care fully satisfies the reasonable 
demands of the compensatory right holder—those conforming to the underlying 
value of equal autonomy that justifies the compensatory right in the first 
instance. 
Despite exercising the amount of reasonable care required by the 
compensatory tort right, the duty holder does not necessarily eliminate risk, 
creating the possibility the interaction might accidentally injure the right holder. 
 
 49.  For more rigorous demonstration, see Mark Geistfeld, Placing a Price on Pain and Suffering: 
A Method for Helping Juries Determine Tort Damages for Nonmonetary Injuries, 83 CALIF. L. REV. 
773, 851–52 (1995). 
 50.  See Mark Geistfeld, Should Enterprise Liability Replace the Rule of Strict Liability for 
Abnormally Dangerous Activities?, 45 UCLA L. REV. 611, 625–33, 639–46 (1998) (relying on empirical 
data and a heuristic assessment to conclude that for each dollar of injury compensation, the individual 
would have to pay roughly forty percent more for third-party insurance than for the optimal mix of 
first-party insurance and self-insurance). 
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In that event, however, the compensatory tort right does not entitle the victim 
to an award of compensatory damages—the duty holder’s exercise of 
reasonable care has already distributed risk in a manner that fully satisfies the 
right holder’s compensatory demands. A compensatory tort obligation does not 
entail the payment of compensatory damages in all cases of accidental harm. 
A cost-minimizing negligence rule also fully enforces the compensatory tort 
right in a second set of cases: those in which the right holder and duty holder 
seller are in a direct or indirect contractual relationship, as in product cases 
involving consumers and manufacturers.51 The consumer–right holder purchases 
or uses a product on the expectation that doing so will be, on balance, 
advantageous. By selling the product, the manufacturer creates a risk of 
physical injury to which the consumer is exposed. A tort rule that makes the 
manufacturer liable for these injuries will affect product costs, price, aggregate 
demand, and net profits. To identify the distributive effects of liability, one must 
first specify the appropriate baseline for analysis. This baseline cannot be 
derived by economic analysis, because cost-benefit analysis depends on prices, 
which in turn depend on the initial allocation of legal entitlements or property 
rights.52 The initial allocation requires normative justification, and so the 
normatively justified tort rule defines the appropriate baseline for evaluating 
the distributive impact of tort liability. At this baseline, the consumer pays for 
the full cost of tort liability, as the equilibrium product price must cover all of 
the seller’s costs, including its liability costs. Consumer interests are the only 
ones that factor into the distributive analysis required by the normatively 
justified tort rule, explaining why products-liability law recognizes that “it is not 
a factor . . . that the imposition of liability would have a negative effect on 
corporate earnings or would reduce employment in a given industry.”53 For risks 
not threatening injury to bystanders, product cases only implicate an 
intrapersonal conflict of consumer interests, those involving physical security, 
liberty (regarding product use), and money (product price and other financial 
costs of product use).54 
 
 51.  Unlike the consumer–manufacturer relationship discussed in the text, in other types of 
contractual relationships, the right holder sells something to the duty holder. The most important 
example is the employment relationship (the sale of labor), in which the employee must be 
compensated for facing work-related risks either by an increase of wages or receipt of compensation for 
work-related injuries. The employer minimizes the total compensatory obligation by minimizing 
accident costs and compensating workers for the residual risks. Employees currently receive both forms 
of compensation, albeit outside of the tort system. (Workplace injuries are governed by workers’ 
compensation schemes that provide guaranteed compensation for work-related injuries.) Consequently, 
workplace injuries provide further support for the conclusion that the law regulates accidental harms in 
a compensatory manner, with the different compensatory legal rule in these cases (one of strict 
liability) stemming from the different form of the contractual relationship (the right holder as seller 
rather than buyer). 
 52.  See Lewis A. Kornhauser, Wealth Maximization, in 3 THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF 
ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 679 (Peter Newman ed., 1998). 
 53.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2 cmt. f (1998). 
 54.  For risks threatening injury to bystanders, the analysis involves the interpersonal mediation of 
security and liberty interests characteristic of more general forms of tort liability. See MARK A. 
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In comparing her own security and liberty interests, the consumer gives no 
special priority to either one. The consumer prefers to pay for product safety 
only if the benefit of risk reduction (fully accruing to the consumer) exceeds the 
cost of the safety investment (also fully borne by the consumer via the 
associated price increase or product-functionality decrease). Consumers 
reasonably expect product-safety decisions to be governed by a cost-benefit 
calculus, because that decisional rule maximizes the net benefit that consumers 
expect to derive from the product. A product that does not satisfy reasonable 
consumer expectations is defective and subjects the seller to liability under the 
widely adopted rule of strict products liability.55 This rule does not entitle 
consumers to compensatory damages in all cases. Due to the relatively high cost 
of tort compensation as compared to other forms of insurance, consumers do 
not reasonably expect to receive tort compensation for injuries caused by 
nondefective products.56 Cost-minimizing tort rules that limit liability to the 
physical harms caused by defective products fully satisfy the reasonable 
compensatory demands of consumer–right holder.57 
As in cases of objective reciprocity, the duty holder in product cases fully 
satisfies the compensatory obligation by making the cost-minimizing 
investments in product safety required by the compensatory tort right. Doing so 
does not necessarily eliminate risk, but the duty holder (having fully satisfied 
the compensatory tort right) is not obligated to pay compensatory damages for 
injuries caused by the residual (or reasonable) risks inherent in most 
nondefective products. Thus, in the contractual context, just as in the 
reciprocal-risk context, the demands of the compensatory right holder are fully 
satisfied by the manner in which the tort duty distributes risk. Tort law can fully 
enforce the compensatory right without granting an entitlement to 
compensatory damages in all cases. 
C. Risk Distribution as Nonideal Compensation 
In a wide range of cases, the negligence rule can attain the ideal 
compensatory outcome by distributing risk to maximize the net benefit that a 
right holder expects to derive from the risky interaction, so the right holder is 
not made worse off, ex ante, than she would otherwise be in a world without the 
risk (and the associated benefit to be gained from participating in the risky 
activity). The only remaining cases involve right holders who are not in a direct 
or indirect contractual relationship with a duty holder who creates an 
 
GEISTFELD, PRINCIPLES OF PRODUCTS LIABILITY 309–20 (2d ed. 2011). 
 55.  See generally id. (using the concept of reasonable consumer expectations to explain the 
important substantive tort doctrines involving liability for defective products). 
 56.  See id. at 61–67 (explaining why consumers do not reasonably prefer an entitlement to tort 
damages for injuries caused by nondefective products due to the relatively high costs they must incur to 
receive tort compensation as compared to the other forms of insurance). 
 57.  See id. at 256–66 (explaining why consumers do not reasonably expect to receive compensatory 
damages in most cases of pure economic loss and stand-alone emotional harms, even when caused by 
defective products). 
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objectively defined nonreciprocal risk of physical harm. In these cases, the 
negligence rule can still distribute risk in the manner reasonably required by the 
compensatory tort right, but the compensation is not ideal, even when 
supplemented by a rule of strict liability. 
These cases involve activities that are not common in the community and 
create risks above the ordinary level of background risk. A paradigmatic 
example involves the use of dynamite for construction purposes, although 
objectively defined nonreciprocal risks are also created in myriad other ways, 
including instances in which the duty holder’s lack of intelligence or skill creates 
dangers above the background level (defined by ordinary intelligence and skill). 
For this class of cases, the tort rule must mediate an interpersonal conflict 
between the duty holder’s interest in liberty and the right holder’s interest in 
physical security. A compensatory tort rule entitles the right holder to prioritize 
the security interest, justifying a right to compensatory damages for these 
injuries—the same outcome that is attained by the rule of strict liability for 
abnormally dangerous activities and the pockets of strict liability within the 
objectively defined negligence standard.58 
The compensation afforded by these forms of strict liability, however, does 
not fully satisfy the compensatory obligation. In the event of a fatal accident, 
the duty holder is not legally obligated to pay compensatory damages for the 
decedent right holder’s loss of life’s pleasures because the monetary award 
cannot compensate a dead person.59 This limitation of the damages remedy 
substantially reduces and potentially eliminates the award of compensatory 
damages for wrongful death.60 The most severe type of physical harm cannot be 
adequately redressed by a rule of strict liability, creating a compensatory 
shortfall. 
To solve the compensatory problem inherent in a rule of strict liability, the 
right holder reasonably prefers to supplement this rule with a behavioral 
obligation of reasonable care that depends on the harm actually threatened to 
the right holder (premature death) as opposed to the amount of compensatory 
damages available in such cases (zero for a decedent’s loss of life’s pleasures). 
When justified by a compensatory right, such a safety obligation must be 
derived from the correlative compensatory duty, which can be defined by 
reference to the total burden a duty holder would incur under ideal conditions 
 
 58.  See GEISTFELD, TORT LAW, supra note 13, at 92–97. 
 59.  See, e.g., Andrew J. McClurg, Dead Sorrow: A Story About Loss and a New Theory of 
Wrongful Death Damages, 85 B.U. L. REV. 1, 6–7, 20–22 (2005) (finding that the decedent’s loss of life’s 
pleasures is not a compensable harm in the vast majority of states). 
 60.  Cf. Romo v. Ford Motor Co., 6 Cal. Rptr. 3d 793, 811 (Ct. App. 2003) (ruling on a punitive 
damages award in a wrongful death case for which the decedent’s estate received no compensatory 
damages); Edward A. Adams, Venue Crucial to Tort Awards: Study: City Verdicts Depend on Counties, 
N.Y. L.J., Apr. 4, 1994, at 1, 5 (reporting results of empirical study finding, among other things, that the 
average tort award in New York City between 1984 and 1993 was three times higher for brain damage 
than for wrongful death, which in turn was only twice as much as the average damage award for a 
herniated disc). 
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in which the right holder is always fully compensated.61 The duty holder does 
not bear this entire compensatory burden under a rule of strict liability, because 
the monetary-damages remedy cannot compensate a dead right holder for the 
loss of life’s pleasures. To eliminate this shortfall, the tort rule can shift that 
component of the compensatory obligation from the damages remedy into the 
duty to exercise reasonable care. These safety expenditures, when added to the 
cost-minimizing precautions that the duty holder would otherwise take under 
ideal compensatory conditions, further reduce risk or the likelihood that the 
right holder will suffer injury, a benefit or form of compensation for the right 
holder. Such a negligence rule requires the duty holder to satisfy the 
compensatory obligation, in part, by incurring these expenses through the 
exercise of reasonable care. The supplemental rule of strict liability then fulfills 
the compensatory obligation with respect to the remaining or residual risks that 
are not eliminated by the exercise of reasonable care and threaten injuries that 
are compensable with the damages remedy. These abnormally dangerous, 
nonreciprocal risks are subject to strict liability, but the default rule of 
negligence liability also continues to distribute risk in the manner reasonably 
required by the compensatory tort right.62 
Nonetheless, the risk distribution in these cases is not ideal for the right 
holder, unlike the distribution in cases of reciprocal risks and products liability. 
As developed above, risk distribution is fully compensatory for right holders 
who (1) incur the burdens of the compensatory duty (as reciprocally situated 
duty holder or consumer) and (2) participate in the risky activity engaged in by 
the duty holder (such as driving or selling a product) on the expectation that 
doing so will be advantageous (defined by the net benefit the right holder 
expects to derive from her automobile trip or use of the product sold by the 
duty holder).63 For nonreciprocal risky interactions that occur outside of 
contractual relationships, neither condition applies. In these cases, the right 
holder does not bear the full burden of the compensatory duty or otherwise 
derive a sufficient benefit from the risky activity engaged in by the duty holder, 
so it is not possible for tort law to distribute risk in a manner that would fully 
compensate the right holder. 
For example, a right holder who faces the risk of injury created by the duty 
holder’s blasting at a construction site does not bear the full burden of the duty 
or otherwise sufficiently benefit from the abnormally dangerous activity. These 
interactions will disadvantage the right holder unless she is fully compensated 
for any resultant injuries, an outcome that cannot be attained by the 
 
 61.  For more rigorous development of this argument, see generally Mark Geistfeld, Reconciling 
Cost-Benefit Analysis with the Principle that Safety Matters More than Money, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 114 
(2001). 
 62.  This reasoning explains why a strictly liable duty holder who reprehensibly rejects the duty to 
exercise reasonable care is subject to punitive damages. Cf. Owens-Ill., Inc. v. Zenobia, 601 A.2d 633, 
653 (Md. 1992) (adopting the majority rule requiring proof of “actual malice” to justify an award of 
punitive damages in cases of strict products liability). 
 63.  See supra Part III.B. 
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compensatory-damages remedy for fatal accidents and other irreparable 
injuries. The duty holder’s compensatory shortfall can be eliminated by 
redirecting these expenditures from the damages remedy to the exercise of 
reasonable care, but the right holder will still ordinarily face some risk of injury 
that cannot be fully compensated by the damages remedy. Tort law cannot 
structure these risky interactions to ensure that the right holder is not made 
worse off, ex ante, than she would otherwise be if the interaction did not occur. 
This compensatory problem, however, does not justify a ban of the risky 
behavior. The compensatory right is based on a relative priority of the security 
interest, not an absolute priority that negates or gives no value to conflicting 
liberty interests.64 By exercising reasonable care and paying compensatory 
damages for the harms foreseeably caused by the residual nonreciprocal risks, 
the duty holder fully satisfies the compensatory obligation. This exercise of 
liberty furthers the autonomy of the duty holder and has normative value that is 
not negated simply just because social conditions or transaction costs sometimes 
make it infeasible to attain the ideal compensatory outcome. The reasonable 
compensatory demands of the right holder—those that give equal concern to 
the autonomy of the duty holder—do not justify a ban of the duty holder’s 
exercise of liberty. These interactions can leave the right holder worse off than 
she would otherwise be, but tort law still distributes risk in the manner that fully 
satisfies the reasonable demands of the compensatory right holder. 
D. Breaches of the Compensatory Duty 
Breach of the primary duty to exercise reasonable care creates a second-
order duty to pay compensatory damages for the physical harms proximately 
caused by the breach. Though inherently related, these two duties are not 
substantively equivalent. Due to the inherent limitations of the compensatory-
damages remedy, the second-order duty to pay compensatory damages does not 
fully substitute for the first-order duty to exercise reasonable care. 
The most severe physical harm governed by tort law is wrongful death, and 
yet monetary damages cannot compensate a dead right holder for the 
premature loss of life. Compensatory damages also do not make the plaintiff–
right holder “whole” in cases of bodily harm, nor does this remedy strive to do 
so.65 Premature death and bodily injury are paradigmatic examples of an 
irreparable injury, although this common-law category also encompasses 
damage to real or tangible property.66 The entire category of physical harms—
 
 64.  See supra Part III.A. 
 65.  See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 903 cmt. a (1979) (stating that a damage award for 
the loss of life’s pleasures is not supposed to “restore the injured person to his previous position” but 
should instead only “give to the injured person some pecuniary return for what he has suffered or is 
likely to suffer”). 
 66.  Mark A. Geistfeld, The Principle of Misalignment: Duty, Damages, and the Nature of Tort 
Liability, 121 YALE L.J. 142, 164 (2011) [hereinafter Geistfeld, The Principle of Misalignment] 
(discussing the rule of irreparable injury and explaining why it ordinarily encompasses damages to real 
or tangible property). 
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bodily injury or damage to real or tangible property—is comprised of 
irreparable injuries that ordinarily cannot be fully compensated by the damages 
remedy. 
In a case of irreparable injury, breaches of the primary compensatory 
obligation to exercise reasonable care will usually not be remedied in a fully 
compensatory manner. The exercise of reasonable care is the only way for a 
duty holder to fully satisfy the reasonable compensatory demands of the right 
holder. The superior compensatory attributes of risk distribution accordingly 
explain why negligence is a “behavioral rule” defined by a first-order behavioral 
obligation that is substantively more important than the second-order duty to 
pay compensatory damages for a breach.67 
To protect the integrity of the first-order duty, tort law prohibits the duty 
holder from consciously rejecting or recklessly ignoring the primary duty to 
exercise reasonable care. A defendant who engaged in this prohibited conduct 
and breached the primary duty is subject to punitive damages, regardless of 
whether the defendant was always willing and able to pay compensatory 
damages.68 The extracompensatory award of punitive damages is required to 
vindicate the plaintiff’s compensatory tort right due to the inherent inadequacy 
of the compensatory-damages remedy. 
But even in these cases, a duty holder breaches the primary duty only if the 
unreasonable conduct proximately caused the right holder to suffer 
compensable harm. The duty holder’s failure to exercise reasonable care, no 
matter how reprehensible, creates no compensatory obligation in the absence of 
injury. There is simply nothing to compensate. In cases of injury, by contrast, 
the duty holder’s breach of the primary compensatory duty to exercise 
reasonable care creates a compensatory shortfall that triggers the second-order 
duty to pay compensatory damages. Tort liability is based on the occurrence of 
injury for obvious compensatory reasons that accord with “ordinary moral 
evaluation” that careless behavior causing injury is “deemed worse” than 
careless behavior that does not ripen into harm.69 
The the inability to compensate fully an irreparable injury explains why the 
primary concern of a compensatory negligence rule is to prevent physical harm 
by obligating the compensatory duty holder to exercise reasonable care. 
According to a leading nineteenth century treatise, in cases of irreparable 
injury, “[J]udges have been brought to see and to acknowledge . . . that a 
remedy which prevents a threatened wrong is in its essential nature better than a 
 
 67.  See Mark A. Geistfeld, Tort Law and the Inherent Limitations of Monetary Exchange: Property 
Rules, Liability Rules, and the Negligence Rule, 4 J. TORT L. 1, 15 (2011). 
 68.  Geistfeld, The Principle of Misalignment, supra note 66, at 165–69 (identifying the types of 
behavior prohibited by the negligence rule and providing citations to cases holding that a defendant 
who engaged in such behavior cannot avoid liability for punitive damages even if fully willing and able 
to pay compensatory damages). 
 69.  John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Torts as Wrongs, 88 TEX. L. REV. 917, 942 
(2010) (arguing in favor of interpretations of tort law that can incorporate this “framework of moral 
thought that people deploy regularly in their daily lives”). 
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remedy which permits the wrong to be done, and then attempts to pay for 
it . . . .”70 In seeking to prevent irreparable injuries, the common law has also 
long recognized the principle that the tort obligation cannot impose undue 
hardship on the duty holder.71 When derived from a compensatory duty, a 
primary obligation to reduce the risk of irreparable harm through the exercise 
of reasonable care does not impose undue hardship on the duty holder. 
Compliance with this duty distributes risk in the manner reasonably demanded 
by the holder of the compensatory tort right, making it possible for tort law to 
compensate right holders for physical harms that cannot be fully repaired by the 
damages remedy. 
IV 
THE DISTRIBUTIVE ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF TORT LAW 
As I have shown, if the Pareto principle is justified by the normative value 
of individual autonomy or equal freedom, then its normative properties can be 
maintained under nonideal conditions with a compensatory decision rule for 
regulating nonconsensual risky interactions.72 I then argued that such a decision 
rule is plausibly instantiated in the default tort rule of negligence liability that 
distributes risk in the manner required by the reasonable demands of a 
compensatory right holder.73 The Pareto principle is not “pointless” as Calabresi 
concluded,74 although my analysis confirms his more important conclusion that 
the economic analysis of risk distribution can inform our understanding of the 
distributive concerns of justice—in this instance, of corrective justice.75 
Notwithstanding Calabresi’s exhortations about the importance of 
distributive economic analysis, the conventional economic analysis of tort law 
only addresses the efficient allocation of scarce resources. This approach 
assumes the government’s only valid distributive concern involves the principle 
of distributive justice, which governs how wealth should be distributed across 
society (by reallocation from the rich to the poor, for example). Wealth 
distributions of this type ordinarily can be attained at the least cost through the 
tax system.76 Once this distributive concern is rendered irrelevant for tort 
 
 70.  3 JOHN NORTON POMEROY, A TREATISE ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE AS ADMINISTERED IN 
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA § 1357 (1883); see also Douglas Laycock, The Death of the 
Irreparable Injury Rule, 103 HARV. L. REV. 687, 689 (1990) (“Judges act on these premises, whether or 
not they consciously acknowledge all that Pomeroy imputed to them.”). 
 71.  Cf. Laycock, supra note 70, at 732–39 (discussing the rule that monetary damages provide the 
remedy for harms that would otherwise be irreparable when equitable relief would interfere with 
countervailing rights or impose undue hardship on the duty holder). 
 72.  See supra Part II.  
 73.  See supra Part III. 
 74.  See supra notes 7–9 and accompanying text. 
 75.  See supra note 10 and accompanying text. 
 76.  See Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Fairness Versus Welfare, 114 HARV. L. REV. 961, 993–94 
(2001) (“[W]hen legal rules do have distributive effects, the effects usually should not be counted as 
favoring or disfavoring the rules because distributional objectives can often be best accomplished 
directly, using the income tax and transfer (welfare) programs. One reason economists have tended to 
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purposes, compensation has value only as a form of insurance for accidental 
injury (otherwise compensation merely shifts a loss from one party to another 
without increasing social wealth). The provision of insurance, in turn, is also 
more effectively accomplished outside of the tort system, in this instance 
through systems of private or government insurance.77 Because other 
institutions are more efficient both at redistributing wealth and supplying 
insurance, the conventional economic analysis of tort law is limited to a search 
for the allocatively efficient rules that would minimize the social cost of 
accidents. Compensatory questions are irrelevant. 
However, the conventional economic analysis of tort law departs from 
modern welfare economics by disregarding the Pareto principle.78 The 
conventional analysis only recognizes distributive justice, which governs the 
appropriate redistribution of resources across society (from the rich to poor, for 
example), whereas the Pareto principle is concerned about compensation within 
a group of interacting individuals (those affected by the change in question). 
How someone is disadvantaged by an interaction defines the need for 
compensation, not the individual’s relative wealth. A primary compensatory 
obligation owed to another is a matter of corrective or interactive justice, not 
distributive justice. The compensation required by the Pareto principle 
fundamentally differs from the redistribution of wealth required by a principle 
of distributive justice, and yet that distinctive distributive concern is ignored by 
the conventional economic analysis of tort law. 
By introducing a new distributive concern, the Pareto principle alters the 
economic analysis of tort law for reasons highlighted by Calabresi’s discussion 
of the principle: 
[E]conomists using the Pareto criterion distinguish between moves to the Pareto 
frontier and moves that shift that frontier outward. The first describes the kind of 
Pareto superior moves that I have argued do not exist ex ante. The second refers to 
technological or other innovations that make possible improvements in well-being 
which previously were not feasible: a better wheat, cheap solar energy, 
superconductors, manna. What I have been saying is that all changes that we are 
concerned with are of one of two sorts. First, there are moves in which there are 
winners and losers, i.e., moves along the frontier. In such moves, winners may win 
more than losers lose, but compensation is not achievable. These moves can be 
justified only if one considers who the winners and losers are and what they have won 
or lost. This, of course, is the implicit basis of much of actual law and economic 
analysis. Second, and at least as important, are shifts of the frontier which create winners 
and may or may not create losers as well. These have been emphasized much less by 
economic analysis of law.
79
 
Once distributive concerns about “winners” and “losers” have been 
expressly incorporated into economic analysis via the Pareto principle, a 
 
favor these direct means of redistribution is that they reach all individuals and are based explicitly on 
income.”). 
 77.  See source cited supra note 50 and accompanying text.  
 78.  See sources cited supra notes 16–19 and accompanying text (discussing the role of the Pareto 
principle within modern welfare economics).  
 79.  Calabresi, The Pointlessness of Pareto, supra note 7, at 1229–30 (emphasis added). 
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compensatory tort system can readily be conceptualized as an innovation that 
shifts the Pareto frontier outwards by permitting “changes that do not 
immediately create new winners and uncompensated losers.”80 Undoubtedly, 
the tort system made everyone better off as compared to the prior social 
practices it replaced—blood feuds and so on—but a compensatory tort system 
can continue to shift the Pareto frontier outwards as society evolves. Given 
what we now know or reasonably could know about risk and safety precautions 
as applied to the particular circumstances of a nonconsensual risky interaction, 
a compensatory tort rule structures the interaction so that this changed social 
relation does not “immediately create new winners and uncompensated losers.” 
A compensatory tort system can continually shift the Pareto frontier outwards 
from the existing state of affairs by distributing risk to ensure that those who 
benefit from new instances of risky behavior satisfy the reasonable 
compensatory demands of those who would otherwise be disadvantaged. 
For these reasons, a compensatory tort rule illustrates how the Pareto 
principle can be implemented by a rights-based legal rule that is not exclusively 
concerned about the promotion of social welfare. The existence of such a rule 
has been called into question by Louis Kaplow and Steven Shavell, who have 
constructed a proof showing that any “fair” legal rule—defined as one giving 
evaluative weight to some factor that does not exclusively depend on welfare—
necessarily violates the Pareto principle.81 This definition of fairness 
encompasses the rights-based compensatory tort rules described above, which 
entitle the right holder to prioritize the security interest for reasons of 
individual autonomy and not social welfare. The proof, however, relies on other 
assumptions about a “fair” tort rule that are not applicable to these 
compensatory tort rules, and so the conclusion of this proof—that “fair” legal  
rules necessarily violate the Pareto principle—does not apply.82 A compensatory 
tort right can implement the Pareto principle within a nonwelfarist tort system, 
providing an important counterexample to the Kaplow and Shavell proof while 
confirming Calabresi’s claims about the importance of distributive economic 
analysis. 
The reasons behind this conclusion are worth detailing; they illustrate more 
fully why Calabresi was correct to conclude that economic analysis can inform 
important questions of justice.83 The Kaplow and Shavell proof assumes that in 
the evaluation of legal rules, the principle of fairness has a constant, significant 
weight that is independent of welfare.84 The proof also assumes that the 
 
 80.  Id. at 1231. 
 81.  See Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Any Non-welfarist Method of Policy Assessment Violates 
the Pareto Principle, 109 J. POL. ECON. 281, 284 (2001); Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, The Conflict 
Between Notions of Fairness and the Pareto Principle, 1 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 63, 68–70 (1999). 
 82.  See Mark A. Geistfeld, Efficiency, Fairness, and the Economic Analysis of Tort Law, in 
THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 234 (Mark D. White ed., 2009). 
 83.  For more extensive discussion, see generally id. 
 84.  The following description of the proof relies on Richard A. Craswell, Kaplow and Shavell on 
the Substance of Fairness, 32 J. LEGAL STUD. 245, 249–57 (2003). 
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(constantly weighted) principle of fairness can be continuously traded off 
against some component of welfare. Due to the tradeoff between fairness and 
welfare, there will be situations in which the choice of a “fair” legal rule comes 
at the expense of some positive welfare gain that would be created by an 
“unfair” welfare-maximizing rule. If the savings produced by the welfare-
maximizing rule could be costlessly redistributed to all members of society, each 
person would benefit from the adoption of that “unfair” rule. But this Pareto 
improvement is barred by the nonwelfarist principle of fairness, creating the 
conflict between the Pareto principle and “fair” legal rules. 
This conflict, however, does not apply to a compensatory tort rule, because 
the associated principle of fairness is not continuously traded off against some 
component of welfare. The compensatory tort rule protects the individual right 
to physical security for reasons of individual autonomy, thereby ruling out the 
maximization of social welfare as the reason for compromising the right 
holder’s autonomy. In this important sense, the individual right constrains social 
welfare and can yield allocatively inefficient liability rules.85 However, the tort 
right does not constrain social welfare in all possible states of the world. The 
right only protects the autonomy of the right holder; it does not bar a right 
holder from exercising her autonomy. A right holder’s fully informed exercise 
of autonomy also promotes her welfare. Thus, when the right holder is 
exercising her autonomy, fairness (autonomy) is not continuously traded off 
against welfare. There simply is no tradeoff. Therefore, these rights-based rules 
do not satisfy the continuity assumption of the Kaplow and Shavell proof, nor 
do they violate the Pareto principle. 
As shown by this example, a rights-based tort system can be justified by 
some nonwelfarist value such as individual autonomy or equal freedom and still 
be concerned about the welfare consequences of liability rules across a wide 
range of cases. Welfare is not the only or even primary value of concern, and so 
compensatory rights-based tort rules are “fair” as defined by Kaplow and 
Shavell. The promotion of Pareto improvements is not the same as the 
promotion of allocative efficiency. But welfare still matters. The governing 
principle of justice can constrain the role of welfare considerations without 
eliminating them. Economic analysis has importance within this constrained 
and yet vitally important space; it helps us figure out what justice requires in the 
case at hand, confirming Calabresi’s claims about the importance of distributive 
economic analysis for normative evaluation in tort law. 
V 
CONCLUSION 
Much like scholars once discussed risk distribution without adequately 
defining the concept, the same has been true of compensation. Tort scholars 
 
 85.  See supra Part III.C (explaining why a compensatory norm justifies allocatively inefficient 
rules governing nonreciprocal risky interactions that occur outside of contractual relationships). 
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have roundly rejected the proposition that tort liability can be plausibly 
conceptualized in compensatory terms, relying on a reason that would seem to 
foreclose further inquiry about the matter: “Measures of compensatory liability 
sometimes exceed, sometimes fall short of, and sometimes bear no relation to 
what is required to make the claimant whole.”86 The rejection of a 
compensatory rationale for tort liability rests on the unexamined premise that 
compensation is exclusively defined by the compensatory-damages remedy. 
But just as Calabresi showed that the concept of risk distribution requires 
elaboration,87 one can do the same with respect to a norm of compensation. The 
payment of compensation by a duty holder can be defined by reference to all 
expenditures required to satisfy the correlative compensatory right. A rigorous 
specification of a compensatory tort right shows why the distribution of risk can 
fully satisfy the compensatory demands of the right holder without an 
entitlement to compensatory damages in all cases of accidental injury. Such a 
tort system is not designed to minimize the social costs of accidents. To employ 
Calabresi’s distributive taxonomy, a compensatory tort system instead shifts the 
Pareto frontier outwards by permitting “changes that do not immediately create 
new winners and uncompensated losers.”88 For reasons revealed by Calabresi’s 
insights about risk distribution and the importance of distributive economic 
analysis, the concept of compensation is much more nuanced than scholars have 
recognized. Tort law can be plausibly interpreted in the compensatory terms of 
the autonomy-based Pareto principle. 
 
 
 86.  Emily Sherwin, Compensation and Revenge, 40 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1387, 1388–89 (2003) 
(arguing that the poor fit between compensation and the damages remedy suggests that compensatory 
damages seek to counterbalance rather than repair a wrong, giving them a “close affinity to revenge”). 
 87.  See supra notes 1–3 and accompanying text. 
 88.  Calabresi, The Pointlessness of Pareto, supra note 7, at 1231. 
